# Class Notes, PHIL 478: Logics for Defeasible Reasoning

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# 1 Default logic

# 1.1 Default rules

- Background language, logical closure
- Rules of form  $X \to Y$
- Where  $\delta = X \to Y$ , have  $Premise(\delta) = X$ ,  $Conclusion(\delta) = Y$ . Also, if S set of defaults, have  $Conclusion(S) = \{Conclusion(\delta) : \delta \in S\}$
- Priorities

# 1.2 Fixed priority default theories

- Definition 1 (Fixed priority default theories) A fixed priority default theory Δ is a structure of the form (W, D, <), in which W is a set of ordinary formulas, D is a set of default rules, and < is a strict partial ordering on D.</li>
- Definition 2 (Extensions) Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ be a fixed priority default theory. Then E is an extension of Δ just in case, for some proper scenario S based on this theory,

$$\mathcal{E} = Th(\mathcal{W} \cup Conclusion(\mathcal{S})).$$

#### 1.3 Stability

Definition 3 (Triggered defaults) Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ be a fixed priority default theory, and S a scenario based on this theory. Then the defaults from D that are triggered in the context of the scenario S are those belonging to the set</li>

$$Triggered_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}) = \{ \delta \in \mathcal{D} : \mathcal{W} \cup Conclusion(\mathcal{S}) \vdash Premise(\delta) \}.$$

Definition 4 (Conflicted defaults) Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ be a fixed priority default theory, and S a scenario based on this theory. Then the defaults from D that are conflicted in the context of the scenario S are those belonging to the set</li>

$$Conflicted_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}) = \{\delta \in \mathcal{D} : \mathcal{W} \cup Conclusion(\mathcal{S}) \vdash \neg Conclusion(\delta)\}$$

Definition 5 (Defeated defaults: preliminary definition) Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩</li>
 be a fixed priority default theory, and S a scenario based on this theory. Then the defaults from D that are defeated in the context of the scenario S are those belonging to the set

$$Defeated_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D},<}(\mathcal{S}) = \{\delta \in \mathcal{D} : \text{ there is a default } \delta' \in Triggered_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}) \text{ such that}$$

$$(1) \ \delta < \delta',$$

$$(2) \ \mathcal{W} \cup \{Conclusion(\delta')\} \vdash \neg Conclusion(\delta)\}.$$

Definition 6 (Binding defaults) Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ be a fixed priority default theory, and S a scenario based on this theory. Then the defaults from D that are binding in the context of the scenario S are those belonging to the set</li>

$$\begin{aligned} Binding_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D},<}(\mathcal{S}) &= \{\delta \in \mathcal{D} : \quad \delta \in Triggered_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}), \\ \delta \not\in Conflicted_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}), \\ \delta \notin Defeated_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D},<}(\mathcal{S}) \end{aligned}$$

 Definition 7 (Stable scenarios) Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ be a fixed priority default theory, and S a scenario based on this theory. Then S is a stable scenario based on the theory Δ just in case

$$\mathcal{S} = Binding_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D},<}(\mathcal{S}).$$

### 1.4 Proper scenarios and extensions

• Definition 8 (Approximating sequences) Let  $\Delta = \langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{D}, \langle \rangle$  be a fixed priority default theory and  $\mathcal{S}$  a scenario based on this theory. Then  $\mathcal{S}_0, \mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2, \ldots$  is an approximating sequence that is based on the theory  $\Delta$  and constrained by the scenario  $\mathcal{S}$  just in case

$$S_{0} = \emptyset,$$
  

$$S_{i+1} = \{\delta : \delta \in Triggered_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}_{i}), \\ \delta \notin Conflicted_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}), \\ \delta \notin Defeated_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D},<}(\mathcal{S})\}.$$

• Definition 9 (Proper scenarios) Let  $\Delta$  be a default theory and S a scenario based on this theory, and let  $S_0, S_1, S_2, \ldots$  be an approximating sequence that is based on  $\Delta$ and constrained by S. Then S is a proper scenario based on  $\Delta$  just in case  $S = \bigcup_{i>0} S_i$ .

- Theorem 1 Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ be a fixed priority default theory and S a proper scenario based on this theory. Then S is also a stable scenario based on the theory Δ.</li>
- Theorem 2 A fixed priority default theory Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ has an inconsistent extension just in case W is inconsistent.</li>
- **Theorem 3** If a fixed priority default theory has an inconsistent extension, this is its only extension.
- Theorem 4 Let S and  $\mathcal{R}$  be proper scenarios based on a fixed priority default theory, with  $\mathcal{R} \subseteq S$ . Then  $\mathcal{R} = S$ .
- Theorem 5 Let  $\mathcal{E}$  be an extension of the fixed point default theory  $\Delta = \langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{D}, < \rangle$ , and suppose  $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{W}$ . Then  $\mathcal{E}$  is is also an extension of the theory  $\Delta' = \langle \mathcal{W} \cup \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{D}, < \rangle$ .

# 1.5 Some consequence relations

- Definition 10 (Credulous consequence) Let  $\Delta$  be a default theory. Then Y is a credulous consequence of  $\Delta$ —written,  $\Delta \triangleright_C Y$ —just in case  $Y \in \mathcal{E}$  for some extension  $\mathcal{E}$  of  $\Delta$ .
- Definition 11 (Skeptical consequence) Let  $\Delta$  be a default theory. Then Y is a skeptical consequence of  $\Delta$ —written,  $\Delta \models_S Y$ —just in case  $Y \in \mathcal{E}$  for each extension  $\mathcal{E}$  of  $\Delta$ .
- Note that credulous consequence is crazy, in the epistemic case.
- Observation 1
  - If  $\langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{D}, < \rangle \models_S A$  and  $\langle \mathcal{W} \cup \{A\}, \mathcal{D}, < \rangle \models_S B$ , then  $\langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{D}, < \rangle \models_S B$ .

# 1.6 Defeasible arguments

• Definition 12 (Defeasible arguments) Where S is a set of default rules and W is a set of propositions, a defeasible argument, originating from W and constructed from S, is a sequence of propositions  $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n$  such that each member  $X_i$  of the

sequence satisfies one of the following conditions: (1)  $X_i$  is an axiom of propositional logic; (2)  $X_i$  belongs to  $\mathcal{W}$ ; (3)  $X_i$  follows from previous members of the sequence by modus ponens; or (4) there is some default  $\delta$  from  $\mathcal{S}$  such that  $Conclusion(\delta)$  is  $X_i$ and  $Premise(\delta)$  is a previous member of the sequence.

Definition 13 (Argument extensions) Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ be a fixed priority default theory. Then Φ is an argument extension of Δ just in case, for some proper scenario S based on this theory,</li>

$$\Phi = Argument_{\mathcal{W}}(\mathcal{S}).$$

- Definition 14 (Grounded scenarios) Let  $\Delta = \langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{D}, \langle \rangle$  be a fixed priority default theory and  $\mathcal{S}$  a scenario based on this theory. Then  $\mathcal{S}$  is grounded in the theory  $\Delta$  just in case  $Th(\mathcal{W} \cup Conclusion(\mathcal{S})) \subseteq Conclusion(Argument_{\mathcal{W}}(\mathcal{S})).$
- Theorem 6 Let  $\Delta = \langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{D}, \langle \rangle$  be a fixed priority default theory and  $\mathcal{S}$  a proper scenario based on this theory. Then  $\mathcal{S}$  is also grounded in the theory  $\Delta$ .
- Theorem 7 Let Δ = ⟨W, D, <⟩ be a fixed priority default theory. Then S is a proper scenario based on the theory Δ just in case S is both stable and also grounded in this theory.</li>

### 1.7 Reiter default theories

- A *Reiter default* is a rule of the form (A : C / B).
- If δ is the Reiter default above, then Premise(δ) = A, Conclusion(δ) = B, Justification(δ) = C.
- Definition 15 (Reiter default theories) A Reiter default theory Δ is a structure of the form (W, D), in which W is a set of ordinary formulas and D is a set of Reiter default rules.
- Definition 16 (R-conflicted defaults) Let Δ = ⟨W, D⟩ be a Reiter default theory, and S a scenario based on this theory. Then the defaults from D that are R-conflicted

in the context of the scenario  $\mathcal{S}$  are those belonging to the set

 $R\text{-conflicted}_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}) = \{\delta \in \mathcal{D} : \mathcal{W} \cup Conclusion(\mathcal{S}) \vdash \neg Justification(\delta)\}.$ 

• Definition 17 (Approximating sequences) Let  $\Delta = \langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{D}, \langle \rangle$  be a Reiter default theory and  $\mathcal{S}$  a scenario based on this theory. Then  $\mathcal{S}_0, \mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2, \ldots$  is an approximating sequence that is based on the theory  $\Delta$  and constrained by the scenario  $\mathcal{S}$  just in case

$$S_{0} = \emptyset,$$
  

$$S_{i+1} = \{\delta : \delta \in Triggered_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}_{i}), \delta \notin R\text{-conflicted}_{\mathcal{W},\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S})\}$$

• Not all Reiter default theories have proper scenarios, and so not all have extensions.

### **1.8** Normal default theories

- A normal default is a default of the form  $A \to B$ .
- A normal default can also be identified with a Reiter default of the form (A : B / B).
   If the default δ is normal, then Justification(δ) = Conclusion(δ).
- Definition 18 (Normal default theories) A normal default theory can be defined as either (A) a prioritized default theory whose priority ordering is empty, or as (B) a Reiter default theory containing only normal defaults.
- Theorem 8 Every normal default theory has an extension.